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SIXTH AMENDMENT-CONFRONTATION CLAUSE-The
United States Supreme Court held in a 6 - 3
decision, that a criminal defendant suffered no
confrontation clause violation when excluded from
the in-chambers competency hearing of two minor
witnesses.
Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987).
In Kentucky v. Stincer,' the United States Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
2
rights under the confrontation clause' were violated when Stincer was
denied access to an in-chambers competency hearing of two minors
who were key witnesses for the prosecution in a sexual assault case.'
Sergio Stincer was indicted in the Circuit Court of Christian County,
Kentucky and charged with committing first degree sodomy. 5 The
alleged victims were two girls under the age of twelve, 6 both of
whom represented key witnesses in the prosecution's case. After a
jury was sworn, an in-chambers competency hearing was held as a
prelude to the presentation of evidence.7 Stincer, over his strong
objection, was excluded from this proceeding, although the public
defender representing him was allowed to participate.8
The judge, prosecutor, and Stincer's counsel examined each child
witness seperately to determine their competency to testify. 9 Ques-
1. Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
4. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2660.
5. See Ky. REv. STAT. § 510.-070 (1985) In Kentucky, a person is guilty of
sodomy in the first degree when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
person who is incapable of consent because he is less than twelve years old.
6. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2660.
7. Id. A determination of the two girls competency to testify was necessary
because of their young age.
8. Id. The trial judge elected to exclude Respondent sua sponte and the
public defender only raised objections after prompting by his client. Id. at 2670
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
9. Id. The questions raised were to determine whether the girls could
remember facts and distinguish between the truth and lying. Id. One of the girls
responded "she would 'get a whopping' if she told a lie." Id. at 2660 n.3.
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tioning was limited to determining the children's competency and
never touched upon the substance of their anticipated testimony at
trial.' 0 The trial judge found the girls competent to testify and the
public defender raised no objections."
In open court before the jury and Stincer, the prosecutor and
defense counsel again challenged the girls competency to testify by
asking them questions similiar to those raised at the earlier hearing
when Stincer was not present.' 2 Stincer was convicted by the jury of
first degree sodomy for having deviate sexual intercourse 3 with the
children and was sentenced to twenty years in prison.'
4
Stincer appealed, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the
trial court decision, 5 finding that Respondent's right to face his
accusers under the confrontation clause and section 11 of the Bill of
Rights of the Kentucky Constitution 6 extended to the competency
hearing. The Kentucky high court reasoned that if Stincer had
attended the competency hearing, his assistance of the defense counsel
in questioning the children could have resulted in a successful chal-
lenge of their competency and thereby altered the outcome of the
trial.17 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari'8 to de-
termine whether the Kentucky Supreme Court erred in holding that
the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment or the due process
10. Id. at 2660.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2661. After the young witnesses completed their testimony, the
public defender elected not to request the trial court to reconsider the competency
of the girls to testify. Id.
13. Id. Deviate sexual intercourse is definded as "any act of sexual gratifi-
cation between persons not married to each other involving sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another". Ky. REV. STAT. § 510.010(1).
14. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2661.
15. Stincer v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Ky. 1986).
16. The Kentucky Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions
the accused has the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face." Ky. Bill of
Rights, § 11.
17. Stincer, 712 S.W.2d at 941. Two concurring Justices stipulated that the
opinion should mandate that competency hearings take place in the open court with
the jury present. In this manner, not only would a defendent's confrontation rights
be ensured, but also a jury could evaluate the credibility of a child witness. Also,
this procedure would eliminate any temptation to raise substantive testimony at an
in-chambers hearing where the criminal defendant is not present. Id. at 942. Two
dissenting Justices distinguished confrontation from cross-examination, arguing that
the former only entitled Stincer to utilize the latter as a method for presenting
evidence to the jury at trial. Id. at 942-43.
18. Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
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clause of the fourteenth amendment 9 were violated when Stincer was
denied an opportunity to participate in an in-chambers competency
hearing.20
The United States Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed the
Kentucky Supreme Court. 21 Justice Blackmun, delivering the majority
opinion,2 2 first addressed the sixth amendment issue. 23 The Court
acknowledged that the confrontation clause provides the criminal
defendant with the right of cross-examination2 4 in a state trial, 25 but
found that Stincer's exclusion from the competency hearing did not
interfere with his right to effective cross-examination.
26
In reaching his conclusion, Justice Blackmun stressed the critical
importance of cross-examination in discovering the truth at trial,
27
and concluded that the confrontation clause represents a "functional"
right.2 1 Justice Blackmun outlined two broad categories of cases that
addressed a criminal defendant's functional right under the confron-
tation clause. 29 The first set of cases concerned the admissibility of
out-of-court statements,30 while the second group of cases dealt with
restrictions on the scope of cross-examination imposed by either
written law or the trial court.3 Justice Blackmun recognized that not
19. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2662.
21. Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices
Brennan and Stevens. Id. at 2660.
22. Id.
23. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
24. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2662, citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
418 (1965).
25. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2662, citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
26. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2666.
27. Id. at 2662. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). See also
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970), quoting 5 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 1367, p.29 (3d ed. 1940).
28. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2662.
29. Id. at 2662-63.
30. Id. at 2663. Justice Blackmun referred to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
65-66 (1980), where the Court held that the statements of an unavailable witness
were admissible at trial because the witness had been subject to full cross-examination
at a preliminary hearing, as an example of when out-of-court statements could be
admitted at trial in a manner consistent with the confrontation clause.
31. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2663. Justice Blackmun cited Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308 (1974), where the Court held that the confrontation clause was violated
when a state confidentiality provision denied the defense counsel an opportunity to
question a witness about his juvenile criminal record, as an example of a law or
trial court ruling that restricted a criminal defendant's opportunity for cross-
examination.
19881 1051
DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW
all confrontation clause claims would arise under one of the two
categories,32 and cautioned that the limit of cross-examination cate-
gory provided only a functional right equivalent to an opportunity
for effective cross-examination.33
After establishing these distinctions, the majority opinion directly
addressed whether excluding Stincer from the competency hearing
denied him a constitutionally protected opportunity for effective
cross-examination under the sixth amendment.34 Justice Blackmun
considered that after the child witnesses were found competent to
testify, no legal barrier prevented Stincer from challenging the girls'
competency in open court.35 Stincer availed himself of this functional
right when his counsel presented questions at trial to the minors
similiar in nature to those utilized in the competency hearing.3 6 The
majority opinion concluded that because the same questions asked
at the competency hearing could be repeated at trial with Stincer
present to aid his counsel, he received an opportunity for effective
cross-examination of the witnesses under the confrontation clause.
3 7
The Court reviewed the case law of Kentucky and other states in
regard to a judge's authority to determine competency and the
standards he should apply in deciding whether a child should testify.38
Kentucky utilizes a well established criteria for determining child
competency39 and the line of questioning rarely touches upon the
32. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2664. Justice Blackmun cited Delaware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S. 15 (1985) (per curiam), where an expert witness for the prosecution who
could not recall the basis for his testimony was subject to unfettered cross-exami-
nation, as an example of a case falling into neither the out-of-court statement nor
the limit of cross-examination category of cases.
33. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2664, citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15
(1985) (per curiam) where the Court stipulated that the confrontation clause guar-
antees the defendant only "an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish." Id. at 20 (emphasis in the original).
34. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2664.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 159 (1970), where the Court
stipulated that as long as the criminal defendant receives an opportunity to effectively
cross-examine a witness at trial, the failure to question a witness when he made
earlier statements cannot easily be shown to be of crucial significance.
38. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2664-66.
39. Id. at 2665. See Moore v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Ky.
1964) which established that the competency of a child witness depends upon whether
the child can observe and recollect facts, narrate those facts to a judge or jury, and
appreciate the moral sense of obligation to tell the truth.
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substantive issues of the trial.40 Also, in Kentucky the responsibility
of determining a child's competency to testify rests with the trial
judge. 4' Other states have established that a judge's duty continues
throughout the trial,42 and defense counsel may ask the judge to
reconsider a child's competency after the child has testified.43 Finding
no inconsistency between the applicable case law and the trial judge's
actions in ruling the girls competent to testify, Justice Blackmun
concluded that Stincer's rights under the sixth amendment were not
violated by his exclusion from the in-chambers competency hearing."
Justice Blackmun next addressed Stincer's claim that his exclusion
from the competency hearing violated his rights under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 45 The Court acknowledged that
the due process clause guarantees a defendant the right to be present
at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding where his absence
would detract from the trial's fairness. 46 The majority once again
emphasized that the competency hearing was limited to general
competency oriented questions47 that never touched upon the young
witnesses' substantive testimony, declining to indicate what its posi-
40. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2665. Questions asked of the children normally
included their name, age, where they attended school, whether they could tell the
truth, and understand the consequences of telling a lie.
41. Id. See Whitehead v. Stith, 268 Ky. 703, 709, 105 S.W.2d 834, 837
(1937), which stipulated that the competency of a witness to testify rests with the
judge, not the jury.
42. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2666. See, e.g., Litzkuhn v. Clark, 85 Ariz. 355,
360, 339 P.2d 389, 392 (1959), which found that the judge who has permitted a
child witness to testify possesses a duty to reverse himself upon due cause and
remove the child from the stand and instruct the jury to disregard the testimony.
See also Davis v. Weber, 93 Ariz. 312, 317, 380 P.2d 608, 611 (1963), which
reaffirmed a trial judge's right to change his mind regarding a child's competency.
43. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2666. See, e.g., In re R.R., 79 N.J. 97, 106, 398
A.2d 76, 80 (1979) where defense counsel moved to have a 4-year old boy declared
incompetent after completion of the prosecutor's questioning.
44. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2666.
45. Id. at 2667. See supra note 19 for the relevant portion of the fourteenth
amendment.
46. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2667. The majority cited Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97 (1934), where the Court recognized not only a defendant's due process
right to personally defend against all charges but also the importance of this right
toward providing a just and fair hearing; the due process clause, however, did not
extend to instances where the defendant's presence would be of no use. Id. at 105-
108.
47. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2667. The competency hearing questions were
directed toward determining the child's ability to recall and articulate facts, distin-
guish between truth and falsehood, and recognize a moral obligation to tell the
truth.
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tion would be had the competency hearing participants been exposed
to such testimony .4 The Court noted that the record contained no
indication that Stincer's presence at the in-chambers hearing would
have altered the judge's finding of competency 49 and concluded that
his exclusion from the hearing did not violate his rights under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 0
Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion 51 in which he described
the competency hearing as a critical stage of trial protected by both
the sixth and fourteenth amendments.12 The dissent first addressed
the confrontation clause and interpreted it as requiring witnesses to
testify against a defendant "in his presence". 3 Justice Marshall
determined that the majority had narrowed the confrontation clause's
application to "exclusively" deal with the right to cross-examina-
tion.14 This interpretation then justified the exclusion of Stincer from
a crucial stage of the trial, the competency hearing. 5
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2668. Justice Blackman pointed out that Stincer presented no
evidence that his personal knowledge of the children or their backgrounds could
have aided his counsel or the judge in their questioning on the young witnesses'
competency.
50. Id. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 527 (1985) (per curiam).
There, a United States District Court judge in a criminal trial interviewed a juror,
in camera, about whether he was prejudiced against a defendant who had been
drawing sketches of the jury. The defense counsel attended the in camera meeting
which the defendant neither asked to attend nor objected to when excluded. The
Supreme Court found that defendant's exclusion from the in camera discussion
threatened neither his opportunity to defend against the charges nor the fundamental
fairness of the trial. Id. at 527. Therefore, the court held that the defendant's due
process right was not violated by his exclusion from the in camera meeting. Id. at
526.
51. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2668. Justice Marshall was joined in his dissent by
Justices Brennan and Stevens.
52. Id. Justice Marshall interpreted the majority's opinion as limiting a
defendant's rights under the confrontation clause to cross-examine witnesses at some
point during the trial. (emphasis in original). Justice Marshall also recognized that
the due process clause issue had not been addressed by the lower courts and was
not properly before the court; if it was, however, he would again dissent.
53. Id. at 2669 (emphasis in original).
54. Id. (emphasis in original). Justice Marshall concluded that once the
majority limited the confrontation clause to providing an opportunity for cross-
examination in the court room, the court could easily find that Stincer's rights were
not violated at the in-chambers hearing since cross-examination was available to him
at a later time in the trial.
55. Id. Justice Marshall cited with approval the Kentucky Supreme Court's
holding in Stincer v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d at 940, that the competency
hearing represented a "crucial phase of the trial."
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The dissent acknowledged that the Court had explored the con-
frontation clause's parameters on prior occasions.5 6 However, for the
first time the Court was substituting a subsequent opportunity to
cross-examine a witness at trial for the right to confront the witness
at an earlier proceeding. 57 Justice Marshall contended that the con-
frontation clause protects more than the right to cross-examination.5 8
The sixth amendment extends beyond physically confronting the
witnesses,5 9 and by implication encompasses the right to physical
presence at every testimonial proceeding. 60
In determining the competency of a child witness to testify, Justice
Marshall argued that the criminal defendant's physical presence would
enhance the fact-finder's decision making process, which under Ken-
tucky law rests with the trial judge. 61 While a defendant's counsel
could assist the judge in determining a witness' competency at an in-
chambers hearing, the defendant's personal knowledge of the witness
could more effectively bring inaccuracies in the witness' answers to
the judge's attention.62 The dissent also contended that confrontation
should occur before the witness testified in front of a jury in open
court with the trial judge's imprimatur of competency. 6
In addition to finding a reduction in the reliability of the compe-
tency hearing, Justice Marshall claimed the majority opinion under-
mined in several respects the confrontation clause's "symbolic" goal
of fairness. 64 First, the trial judge raised the issue of Stincer's
56. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2669. Justice Marshall argued that the majority's
categorial analysis of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970), and Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) was largely beside the
point since in those cases no question existed about the defendant's right to be
present during testimony.
57. Id.
58. Id. The right to cross-examination is "included in" the broader right of
the defendant to confront the witnesses. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 157. See also Ohio v. Roberts 448 U.S. at 63
nn.5-6.
59. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2669, citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 315.
60. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2669.
61. Id. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
62. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2669-70. Justice Marshall found that attributing to
the defense counsel all relevant facts necessary for a trial court determination of
competency to be "functionally inefficient and fundamentally unfair". Id. at 2670.
63. Id. at 2669-70 (emphasis in original).
64. Id. at 2670. The dissent referred to Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986),
where the court remarked that the constitutional right to confrontation contributes
to not only the reality, but also the perception of fairness in the criminal justice
system. Id. at 2062.
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exclusion from the in-chambers competency hearing without any
prompting by the Commonwealth. 65 Second, the court-appointed
defense attorney raised no objection to his client's exclusion until
after Stincer personally protested. 66 Finally, no reason for excluding
Stincer was given by either the trial judge or the prosecuting attor-
ney. 67 Justice Marshall concluded that Stincer's exclusion was not
only unrequested and unjustified, but more importantly it subverted
the confrontation clause's symbolic function of fairness.
68
Justice Marshall also raised the question of whether the majority's
opinion would force a criminal defendant to select between two
constitutionally protected rights. 69 If a criminal defendant exercised
his sixth amendment right of self-representation he would undoubt-
edly have been permitted to attend the competency hearing. 70 Thus,
a criminal defendant could foreseeably face the dilemma of choosing
between either having assistance of counsel and being excluded from
the competency hearing, or appearing pro se in order to attend this
important stage of trial. 71 Indicating that a defendant should not be
forced to select between two fundamental rights 7 Justice Marshall
criticized the Court for neglecting to address whether requiring a
defendant to make such a choice was constitutionally defensible.
73
Addressing Stincer's fourteenth amendment due process claim,
Justice Marshall considered whether a criminal defendant had a right
to attend any portion of the trial where his presence "has a relation,
reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend
against the charge."' 74 Justice Marshall agreed with the Court that
65. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2670. "The trial judge raised this issue sua
sponte ..
66. Id. at 2670 n.1. "Only the personal protestations of [Stincer], a recent
Cuban immigrant whose fluency in the English language was limited, preserved the
issue for appeal." Id. at 2670.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2671. Justice Marshall sympathized with the concerns a criminal
defendant might have about the judge, prosecutor, and court appointed attorney




72. Id., citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), where
the Court held a defendant's testimony to suppress evidence under the fourth
amendment could not be used to establish his guilt in violation of the fifth
amendment.
73. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2671.




the competency hearing had a reasonably substantial relation toward
determining Stincer's guilt, but disputed the majority's decision to
dismiss the due process argument after determining Stincer's exclusion
caused no harm. 75 This approach inappropriately shifted the issue
from whether a due process violation occurred to whether the vio-
lation was harmless and unfairly placed the burden on the defendant
to establish harm resulting from the constitutional deprivation.76
Concluding his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the due process
clause does not raise a presumption that a trial judge acts harmlessly
when excluding a criminal defendant from a critical stage of trial,
namely the competency hearing of the prosecution's key witnesses. 77
The criminal defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses and
cross-examine them dates back to the beginning of American juris-
prudence. 78 A primary motivation for cross-examination centered on
the need to protect a criminal defendant against witnesses possessing
faded memories or dishonorable motivations by providing the accused
with an opportunity to prove the State's accusations untrue. 79 The
primary method for confronting the witness was cross-examination.
8 0
Another rationale supporting confrontation was that it improved the
fact finding process by compelling a witness "to stand face-to-face
with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief"."'
75. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2671-72. Justice Marshall stated that the Court had
determined Stincer's attendence at the in-chambers hearing would not have improved
the reliability of the competency proceeding. Id. at 2672.
76. Id. Justice Marshall considered United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522
(1985) (per curiam), to be an inadequate foundation for the court to place the
burden of establishing harm on the criminal defendent.
77. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2672.
78. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Charbourn rev. 1974). "For two centuries
past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the
necessity of testing by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law."
79. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1958). Chief Justice Warren stated
that "We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation
and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth
Amendment which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the
right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against them"'. Id. at 496.
80. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-05 (1965). "It cannot seriously be
doubted . . . that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an
.accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him. And probably no
one . . . would deny the value of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and
bringing truth in the trial of a criminal case." Id. at 404. Cross-examination
represents the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5
WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 1367.
81. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). In Mattox, the
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The Supreme Court in Snyder v. Massachusetts,82 although ad-
dressing a due process claim, set the parameters by which more recent
courts would determine whether a criminal defendant could complain
under the confrontation clause about exclusion from a trial proceed-
ing. In Synder, Justice Cardozo established that "[s]o far as the
fourteenth amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is
a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing
would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." 3 Justice
Cardozo stipulated that a criminal defendant had a right to confront
witnesses only when the defendant's presence had a reasonably sub-
stantial relation to his opportunity to defend himself.8 4 Consequently,
the defendant had no privilege to be present when "presence would
be useless, or the benefit but a shadow". 8 On the other hand, Justice
Cardozo did find that the "stages of the trial when there are witnesses
to be questioned" was within the limits on the privilege of confron-
tation 86
The United States Supreme Court first made the sixth amendment
right to confront a witness applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Pointer v. Texas.17 In subsequent years,
the Court established that its confrontation clause cases fall into two
broad, 8 but nonexclusive 9 categories. The first category of cases
Court held that a transcribed copy of the testimony of two witnesses from an initial
murder trial who had since died could be admitted as evidence at a subsequent trial
and could not be impeached. Mr. Justice Brown, writing for the majority, reasoned
that although the defendant cbuld not confront his accusers at the second trial, he
had a full opportunity at the first trial to cross-examine the witnesses and attempt
to impeach their testimony.
82. Snyder v. Massachusets, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). In Snyder, a criminal
defendant charged with murder was excluded from accompanying the defense
attorney, jury, judge, and prosecutor on their viewing of the scene of the crime.
The Court held that defendent's right to due process under the fourteenth amendment
were not violated by his absence from the viewing.
83. Id. at 107-08.
84. Id. at 105-06.
85. Id. at 106-07.
86. Id. at 107.
87. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The state court admitted as
evidence at trial a transcript of a witness's testimony from a preliminary hearing
where the criminal defendant did not have counsel. The Supreme Court found that
since the witness failed to appear at trial the criminal defendant's rights were violated
under the confrontation clause. "We hold today that the sixth amendment's right
of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right
and is made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 403.
88. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 18 (per curiam). See also Stincer, 107
S. Ct. at 2663.
89. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 18-19 (per curiam).
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addresses situations where out-of-court statements had been admitted
as substantive evidence under one of the numerous exceptions to the
hearsay rule. 9° The second set of cases deals with limitations on the
cross-examination of a witness at trial imposed either by the law or
by the court. 9' However, in some instances the Supreme Court could
not neatly fit a case into either the first or the second category.
92
The first line of confrontation clause cases concerns whether the
admission at trial of "out-of-court statements" as substantive evi-
dence under an exception to the hearsay rule violated the criminal
defendant's right to confront (cross-examine) the declarant of the
hearsay statement. For example, in Barber v. Page93 the Supreme
Court held that a trial court violated a criminal defendant's right to
confrontation by admitting as substantive evidence a declarant's
preliminary hearing testimony, when it was not subject to cross-
examination, and the prosecutor had failed to make a good faith
effort to present the declarant as a witness at trial. 94 The Supreme
Court maintained a consistent position in California v. Green,95
holding that when a witness appeared to testify in a state court trial
and was subject to cross-examination, the preliminary hearing testi-
mony of the witness could be used as evidence without violating the
sixth amendment. 96 Thus, the Court established that "[w]hen a wit-
90. Id. For cases that exemplify this catagory, see Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719 (1968), California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980). See also, Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) and Lee v.
Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
91. Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 S. Ct. at 294. For the case best exemplifying
this category, see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). See also Delaware v.
VanArsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986) and Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989
(1987).
92. Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 S. Ct. at 294. This decision represents a case
that falls into neither the "out-of-court statement" nor the "limit of cross-exami-
nation" category. Id.
93. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
94. Id. at 724-25. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, stipulated that
even if the declarant had been cross-examined at the preliminary hearing, without
a good faith effort to present him at trial, the court would have reached the same
result. "The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the
opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor
of the witness." Id. at 725.
95. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
96. Id. at 158. In Green, a witness' statements from a preliminary hearing
were inconsistent with his later trial testimony in state court, but were admitted as
substantive evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 151-52. The
court, per Justice White, determined that while out-of-court statements are neither
under oath nor subject to cross-examination nor observed by a jury, as long as the
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ness is available to testify in court, his prior statement, even if
reliable, generally will be inadmissible to prove the truth of what it
asserts unless the witness is produced for cross-examination." 97
The Supreme Court established the present day test in Ohio v.
Roberts98 for evaluating whether a confrontation clause violation
occurred in the "out-of-court statement" category of cases. In Rob-
erts, the Court held that the admission of a declarant's preliminary
hearing statement as substantive evidence was permissible under the
sixth amendment when the hearsay statement was subject to cross-
examination99 and the declarant was legitimately unavailable for
trial. 00 The first part of the test for determining the admissibility of
hearsay statements requires the prosecution to either produce the
declarant of the out-of-court statement for trial or demonstrate his
unavailability. 10 Once unavailability has been established, the second
prong of the test only permits the admission of prior testimony when
it bears some "indicia of reliability". 02 The principle method for
producing reliable evidence requires that a declarant's statements be
subject to cross-examination, both as a matter of form and purpose. 03
declarant appears as a witness subject to cross-examination at trial these protections
of the confrontation clause are essentially restored. Id. In addition, Justice White
reasoned that a defendant's inability to cross-examine a witness' statements made
outside of court cannot easily be considered of crucial significance when the
defendant may fully cross-examine the witness at trial. Id. at 159. The Court also
noted that the preliminary hearing statements of the witness were admissible, apart
from whether the defendant confronted the witness at the subsequent trial, since
the defendant received a full opportunity to confront the witness at the preliminary
hearing. Id. at 165.
97. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (1986) (Justice Blackmun dissenting).
In Lee, the state court convicted the petitioner of two murders using a codefendant's
confession as substantive evidence, although the codefendant did not testify at trial
and was not subject to cross-examination (under the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination). Id. at 2060-61. The Court, per Justice Brennan, held
that the codefendant's confession accusing the petitioner was inherently unreliable
as hearsay evidence and any conviction based upon such evidence not subject to
cross-examination at trial violated the petitioner's constitutional right to confron-
tation. Id. at 2065.
98. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
99. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73, citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216
(1972).
100. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75.
101. Id. at 65.
102. Id. at 65-66, citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 213.
103. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71. A defense counsel's questioning assumes the
"form" of cross-examination where leading questions are utilized. Counsel's inquiries
comform to the "purpose" of cross-examination when the questions challenge




Thus, under the Roberts test, only when the declarant is unavailable
for trial and the statement contains some "indicia of reliability" may
the out-of-court statement be admitted without undermining the
confrontation clause.l°4
The application of the Roberts analysis to the "out-of-court state-
ment" category of confrontation clause cases was most extensively
applied in Lee v. Illinois/°5 where both the majority and dissenting
opinions utilized the Roberts test, although they reached opposite
conclusions.' °6 At trial, Lee was convicted of two murders on the
strength of her codefendant's confession, although neither defendant
testified. 0 7 The majority applied the "indicia of reliability" prong
of the Roberts test to determine whether the facts rebutted the
presumption that a codefendant's confession was unreliable.10 8 Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, recognized that the codefendant's
confession was neither subject to cross-examination nor consistent
with Lee's confession on several important points.'0 9 Therefore, the
majority concluded that the codefendant's confession did not bear
some "indicia of reliability" and held that its admission as substantive
evidence at trial violated Lee's rights under the confrontation clause."l 0
The dissenting Justices in Lee also applied the Roberts test, but
their analysis led to a different conclusion."' Under the first part of
the test, Justice Blackmun, speaking for the dissenters, determined
that the codefendant was essentially unavailable as a witness because
if called to testify he would have invoked his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination."' Applying the second prong of
104. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2066 (emphasis added).
105. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
106. The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Brennan who was joined
by Justices White, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor. Id. at 2057. The dissenting
opinion was written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Id. at 2066.
107. Id. at 2057.
108. Id. at 2063. Justice Brennan noted that the confrontation clause not only
helps achieve the symbolic goals of creating in the criminal justice system the
perception as well as the reality of fairness, but also creates the functional right of
cross-examination which promotes reliability in criminal trials. Id. at 2062.
109. Id. at 2064.
110. Id. at 2065. Justice Brennan found that the co-defendant's confession
fell short of satisfying the admissibility standard of the confrontation clause which
"countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no
material departure from the reason of the general rule"' (that hearsay evidence is
inadmissible). Id. at 2064, citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
111. Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2066.
112. Id. at 2067.
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the test, the dissent concluded, in contrast to the majority, that the
co-defendant's confession did possess some "indicia of reliability"." 3
Justice Blackmun reasoned that while the majority could presume
the confession was inaccurate, because it did not shift blame away
from the codefendant to Lee, the out-of-court statement appeared
reliable. 1 4 Justice Blackmun also noted that Lee and codefendant's
confessions were strikingly similiar in detail and this consistency
added credibility to the codefendant's hearsay statement." 5 Therefore,
the dissent found that both parts of the Roberts test were satisfied
and admission of the codefendant's confession as substantive evidence
did not violate Lee's rights under the confrontation clause. 16
The second line of confrontation clause cases addresses whether a
criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights are violated when either
the law or the courts impose restrictions on cross-examination at
trial. The paramount case in the cross-examination category is Davis
v. Alaska." 7 There, the trial court prohibited the defense counsel
from questioning the prosecution's key witness, a minor, about his
being on probation by order of a juvenile court." 8 The Supreme
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, recognized that the
State possessed an interest in protecting a child's anonymity as a
juvenile offender, but found that this interest was outweighed by the
criminal defendant's constitutional right to confrontation." 9 The
Court concluded that without the right to effective cross-examination,
the defense counsel was denied an opportunity "to expose to the
jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and
credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the relia-
bility of the witness' ".120
113. Id. at 2068. Justice Blackmun noted that the Court has never established
a per se inadmissibility rule against the confessions of a codefendant and cited
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), as an example of a case where the
admissibility of a co-defendant's confession was not challenged. Lee, 106 S. Ct. at
2068 n.5.
114. Id. at 2069.
115. Id. Justice Blackmun pointed out that the codefendant's confession was
less favorable to him than Lee's version of the murders. In addition, the codefen-
dant's statements failed to reduce his own complicity in the crimes.
116. Id. at 2071.
117. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974).
118. Id. at 310-11.
119. Id. at 319. Chief Justice Burger made it clear that confrontation "means
more than being allowed to confront the witness physically." Id. at 315. The Court
also stated that "the main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for
the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination." Id. at 315-16, citing 5 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original).
120. Id. at 318.
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The issue of limitations on cross-examination was recently ad-
dressed by the United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Van
Arsdall.121 There, the trial judge prohibited the criminal defendant's
counsel from pursuing a line of questioning aimed at establishing
bias in a prosecution witness that had drunk-driving charges against
him dropped after agreeing to cooperate with the prosecutor and
testify.'2 2 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reasoned that the
trial judge's decision prevented the jury from reasonably drawing
inferences about the credibility of the witness' testimony.2 3 Noting
that "the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that
[the witness] would be biased,' 1 24 the Supreme Court concluded that
the criminal defendant's rights were violated under the confrontation
clause. 121
After finding a violation of the confrontation clause in Van Ars-
dall, the Supreme Court considered whether the Delaware Supreme
Court was correct in refusing to apply the Chapman harmless-error
analysis 126 to the case.'27 Justice Rehnquist recognized that constitu-
tional errors which touch upon a criminal defendant's fundamental
rights require automatic reversal of a conviction, but determined that
a restriction at trial on cross-examination of an adverse witness did
121. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
122. Id. at 1434.
123. Id. at 1436.
124. Id. at 1435 (emphasis in original).
125. Id. "We think that a criminal defendant states a violation of the con-
frontation clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise
appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the
part of the witness ... [the criminal defendant in this case] has met that burden
here." Id. at 1436.
126. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) requires that an otherwise
valid conviction be upheld where the party found in error can establish "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained." Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1436, citing Chapman v. California,_386 U.S.
at 24. In other words, the Chapman Court determined that certain constitutional
errors at trial may have a "harmless" effect on the fact finding procegs and.in
these instances a court of appeals should not set aside an otherwise valid conviction.
Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1436.
127. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1436-37. The Chapman harmless-error analysis
had previously been applied to the "out-of-court statement" category of confron-
tation clause cases. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) where the
Supreme Court found that the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's statement
as evidence in a criminal defendant's trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) where Chief Justice Burger
stated for a unanimous Court that "[w]e reject the notion that a Burton (admission
of a hearsay statement) error can never be harmless." Id. at 231.
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not fall into the per se reversal category.128 Thus, the Supreme Court
held that an unconstitutional restriction on the right of cross-exam-
ination imposed by either the law or the court was subject to the
Chapman harmless-error analysis.'2 9 The Court therefore vacated the
Delaware Supreme Court's judgment and remanded to the lower
court to determine "whether, assuming that the damaging potential
of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might
nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt". 130
The issue of whether a confrontation clause violation occurred in
the "limit on cross-examination" category was also closely scrutinized
by the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.",
There, a criminal defendant convicted of sexually abusing his daugh-
ter was denied pre-trial discovery access to the records of a state
child abuse protective service agency which claimed that its files were
privileged under a Pennsylvania confidentiality statute.' Although
the trial court did not limit the criminal defendant's cross-examination
of his daughter, the chief prosecution witness, the criminal defendant
argued on appeal that without access to the state agency documents
he was hampered in his ability to cross-examine his daughter and
thus denied his sixth amendment right to confrontation and com-
pulsory process.' 33 Utilizing a due process analysis of the compulsory
process claim, 3 4 a bare majority of the Justices'35 voted to remand
128. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1437. Examples of constitutional errors
requiring automatic reversal include denying a criminal defendant assistance of
counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and placing a criminal
defendant before a fact finder with a financial interest in the trial's outcome, Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
129. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1438. Justice White concurred in the judgment
as to the application of the Chapman analysis, but would not find a sixth amendment
violation unless the limitation on cross-examination changed the outcome of the
trial. Id. at 1438-39.
130. Id. at 1438. The factors to be considered in a harmless-error analysis
include "the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether
the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prose-
cution's case." Id., citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. at 254.
131. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987).
132. Id. at 994.
133. Id. at 995.
134. Id. at 1001.
135. Justice Powell, author of the opinion, was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, and O'Connor in his compulsory process/
due process analysis. Id. at 994. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion joined by
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to the trial court for a harmless error evaluation of whether the
criminal defendant's access to the state agency files would have
changed the outcome of the trial. 
13 6
A plurality of Justices'37 in the Ritchie case also addressed whether
the confrontation clause was violated when the trial court deprived
the criminal defendant pre-trial discovery access to the state agency
records. 3 8 Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, recognized the
sixth amendment right to confrontation as basically a trial right'3 9
and noted that neither the trial court nor any statute restricted the
criminal defendant's cross-examination of his daughter at trial.' n°
Justice Powell stated that the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse
witness did "not include the power to require the pre-trial disclosure
of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting
unfavorable testimony.""14 The plurality held that the confrontation
clause only applied to the actual trial stage and did not encompass
the pretrial discovery of information. 42 Thus, the Court concluded
that, in the criminal defendant's case, no violation of the confron-
tation clause occurred.
43
Justice Blackmun, who joined the Ritchie Court in its compulsory/
due process determinations but not its confrontation clause analysis,
wrote a separate opinion to elaborate on his interpretation of a
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia. Id. at 1009. The dissent argued that since
the Court was one of limited jurisdiction it should dismiss the petitioner's writ
because the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court below was not final. Id.
at 1013.
136. Id. at 1002.
137. Justice Powell's confrontation clause analysis was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor; however, Justice Blackmun did not
join this part of the opinion. Id. at 994.
138. Id. at 998.
139. Id. at 999, citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 157 and Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. at 725.
140. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1000.
141. Id. at 999.
142. Id. at 999 n.9. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justice Marshall, in which he took strong exception to the plurality's narrow finding
of the confrontation clause as only being applicable to events that occurred at trial.
Justice Brennan argued that denying a criminal defendant access to information
outside the trial creates a significant impediment on cross-examination at trial and
thereby undercuts the protections of the confrontation clause. Id. at 1009. In the
present case, Justice Brennan reasoned that denying the criminal defendant access
to the state agency records undermined his efforts to impeach the witness at trial
and therefore the dissent would have found a confrontation clause violation. Id. at
1006.
143. Id. at 1000.
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criminal defendant's rights under the sixth amendment. 44 Justice
Blackmun disagreed with the plurality's interpretation of the con-
frontation clause as having no relevance to pretrial discovery and in
this respect was substantially in agreement with Justice Brennan's
dissent. 1 5 Justice Blackmun contended that a confrontation clause
analysis must look beyond the plurality's examination of whether
cross-examination was limited at trial, to the deeper question of
whether the criminal defendant had an opportunity at trial to effec-
tively challenge the credibility and bias of an adverse witness.
146
In questioning whether the purposes of cross-examination were
satisfied under the confrontation clause, Justice Blackmun would
apply his analysis to two different sub-categories of "limit on cross-
examination" cases. 147 In the first sub-group, simple questioning of
the witness at trial would provide the criminal defendant with an
opportunity to effectively challenge the credibility of an adverse
witness and undermine his testimony. 4 However, in the second sub-
category, simple questioning fails to undermine a witness' testimony
and may actually harm a criminal defendant by making his cross-
examination appear, in the eyes of a fact finder, to be a baseless
line of questioning against an apparently innocent witness. 49
Justice Blackmun reasoned that the Ritchie case fell into the second
sub-category of the "limit on cross-examination" line of confronta-
144. Id. at 1004. Justice Blackmun concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment.




148. Id. at 1004-05. Justice Blackmun used Deleware v. Fensterer, 106 S. Ct.
292 (1985) (per curiam) as an example of the simple questioning line of cases. There,
a criminal defendent's counsel's cross-examination, which was not limited by the
judge or law, of an expert witness revealed that the expert could not remember the
method of testing he used to reach the conclusions he testified to at trial. Id. at
293. Justice Blackmun reasoned that the simple questioning of the expert witness
was sufficient to seriously undermine his credibility while continuing to protect the
criminal defendent's confrontation right. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004-05.
149. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1005. Justice Blackmun referred to Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308 (1974), as an example of a case in the second sub-category. There,
the criminal defense attorney was permitted to question the key prosecution witness
for bias, but under a state rule could not make reference to the witness' juvenile
record. Id. at 310-11. Thus, simple questioning of the witness did not give the
criminal defendent an opportunity to undermine the witness' credibility and actually
gave the appearance that "defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless
line of attack on the credibility of an apparently blameless witness." Ritchie, 107
S. Ct. at 1005, citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 318.
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tion clause cases.' 50 The defense counsel's simple questioning had no
potential for establishing bias in the prosecution's key witness, the
defendant's daughter, without access to the state agency files.' 5 ' In
addition, from the jury's perspective as fact-finder, the defense
counsel's questions created the appearance that a blameless witness
was being needlessly harassed. 5 2 Therefore, Justice Blackmun con-
cluded that denial during pretrial discovery'53 of the state agency file
hindered cross-examination at trial and would constitute a violation
of a criminal defendant's right to confrontation.
5 4
Although the Supreme Court generally placed confrontation clause
claims into either the "out-of-court statements" or "limit on cross-
examination" line of cases, the Court found neither category applied
in Delaware v. Fensterer.155 There, the testimony of an expert witness
for the prosecution in a murder trial was admitted over defense
counsel's objections that proper cross-examination was impossible
because the witness could not recall the theory used to support his
conclusions. 5 6 The Court stipulated the first category of confronta-
tion clause cases failed to apply because the prosecutor made no
attempt to introduce any out-of-court statements of the expert wit-
ness. 5 7 The per curiam opinion also reasoned the second line of sixth
amendment cases was inapplicable since neither the trial court nor
150. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1005.
151. Id. Justice Blackmun drew a parallel with Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974), where defense counsel was also unable to establish bias with simple ques-
tioning because the juvenile record of the prosecution witness could not be utilized.
Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1005, citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 311 n.1.
152. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1005. Justice Blackmun also concluded that in
Davis the inability of the defendant's attorney to refer to the witness' juvenile record
created the impression in the jury's eyes of counsel annoying an unbiased witness.
153. Id. at 1006. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that in Davis the Court
found the criminal defendant's confrontation right violated during the trial, while
in Ritchie the constitutional infringement occurred during the pretrial stage. Id. at
1005-06. However, Justice Blackmun determined that the state can not "avoid
confrontation clause problems simply by deciding to hinder the defendant's right to
effective cross-examination, on the basis of a desire to protect the confidentiality
interests of a particular class of individuals, at the pretrial, rather than at the trial,
stage." Id. at 1006.
154. Id. Although Justice Blackmun's analysis indicated a confrontation clause
violation existed, he concurred in the judgment to remand to the trial court, reasoning
that the guidelines for an in camera examination of the files under Justice Powell's
majority opinion were adequate to protect the criminal defendant's confrontation
clause rights.
155. Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 S. Ct. 292 (1985) (per curiam).
156. Id. at 293.
157. Id. at 294.
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state law limited the scope or nature of cross-examination of the
prosecution's expert witness. 58
The Supreme Court found in Fensterer that the defendant had an
opportunity for effective cross-examination of the expert witness,
although because of the memory lapse the defense counsel could not
cross-examine to the extent he might wish. 59 The per curiam opinion
admitted that a faulty memory impedes one approach to discrediting
a witness; however, the Court reasoned that the forgetfulness opens
an opportunity for the defense counsel to convince the fact-finder
that the testimony of a witness unable to remember the basis for his
conclusions deserves lesser weight.160 Thus, the Court concluded that
without either the admission of an out-of-court statement or limit
on cross-examination, and with a full, unhindered opportunity to
question the expert witness and challenge his credibility, the con-
frontation clause was not offended by admitting into evidence the
testimony of a witness who failed to recall the basis for his testi-
mony. 16'
The United States Supreme Court's approach to Kentucky v.
Stincer presented the Justices with two basic issues. First, whether
prior case law provided Stincer with a legitimate confrontation clause
claim under either the "out-of-court statement," 62 or "limit of cross-
examination," 63 category of cases or, possibly neither line of cases.'6
If precedent revealed that Stincer's case qualified for further analysis
under one of the appropriate confrontation clause categories, the
Supreme Court should then have considered the second issue of
whether Stincer's sixth amendment rights were actually violated when
he was excluded from an in-chambers competency hearing of two
minor witnesses in a sexual assault case.
165
Justice Blackmun's opinion outlined the "out-of-court statement"
line of confrontation clause cases, 66 but failed to explicitly stipulate
158. Id.
159. Id. at 295 (emphasis in original), citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
73 (1980).
160. Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 S. Ct. at 294. "[T]he confrontation clause is
generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe
and expose [forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination, thereby
calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the
witness' testimony." Id. at 296.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
165. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2660.
166. Id. at 2663.
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whether this analysis was applicable to Stincer's case. Nevertheless,
a careful reading of Stincer would reveal that the majority opinion
never again referred to the "out-of-court statement" line of cases,
raising an inference that the Court considered these cases inappro-
priate to resolving Stincer's claim.1
67
If Justice Blackmun had applied the test in Ohio v. Roberts,'68 he
would have also reached the conclusion that the "out-of-court state-
ment" line of confrontation clause cases would not benefit Stincer.
69
Specifically, the minor witnesses' statements from the in-chambers
competency hearing were not admitted as substantive evidence at
trial. 170 In addition, the minor witnesses appeared at trial and both
the prosecutor and defense counsel subjected them to questioning
aimed at challenging their competency.' 7' Therefore, Justice Black-
mun was justified in not exploring Stincer's claim of a confrontation
clause violation under the "out-of-court statement" line of cases.
172
The Supreme Court's discussion of whether Stincer could claim a
sixth amendment violation placed much greater emphasis on the
"limit on cross-examination" category of cases. 73 Although several
Justices had previously determined that the right to confrontation
was basically a trial right,1 74 Justice Blackmun's opinion centered on
whether a criminal defendant received an opportunity to effectively
cross-examine a witness. 75 Stincer was denied access to the in-
167. Id. at 2664.
168. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66. Under the Roberts' test, hearsay comments
may only be admitted as substantive evidence when the declarant either appears at
trial or he is legitimately unavailable and his statements bear some indicia of
reliability.
169. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) and California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970).
170. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2660.
171. Id. at 2661.
172. Justice Marshall's dissent contended that the "out-of-court statement"
analysis could not be applied because it was based upon the presumption that the
criminal defendant had a right to be present when the witness testified. Id. at 2669.
173. Justice Blackmun's opinion described the "limit on cross-examination"
category of cases. Id. at 2663. His analysis centered on these cases and led him to
the conclusion no confrontation violation occurred. Id. at 2664-66.
174. Only a plurality of four Justices, including now retired Justice Powell,
agreed the confrontation clause was basically a trial right that did not extend to
pretrial discovery. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999.
175. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2664. Justice Blackmun has contended that the
sixth amendment protects non-trial activities that impact upon a criminal defendant's
opportunity to effectively challenge the bias and credibility of an adverse witness at
trial. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and
Marshall have also argued that denial of access to outside information impedes a
criminal defendant's cross-examination at trial. Id. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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chambers competency hearing and at that time could not challenge
the minor witnesses credibility by cross-examination. 7 6 Thus, Justice
Blackmun's concentration on the "limit on cross-examination" line
of cases appeared to provide Stincer with his most legitimate con-
frontation clause argument.
Justice Blackmun's analysis was correct in placing emphasis on the
"limit on cross-examination" category of confrontation clause cases.
77
However, the court should have gone one step further and considered
the merits of Stincer's claim in light of Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.178 In Ritchie, Justice Blackmun
articulated two sub-categories of the "limit on cross-examination"
line of cases. 79 The second sub-group established that a confrontation
violation existed when a denial of pretrial information made effective
cross-examination, to impeach the credibility and bias of a witness,
impossible.8 0 If the reasoning of Justice Blackmun's concurrence in
Ritchie was applied to Stincer's exclusion from the in-chambers
competency hearing, his claim would appear even more viable than
under the general "limit on cross-examination" analysis actually used
by the court.
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Stincer made almost no reference
to confrontation case law that falls into neither the "out-of-court
statement" nor "limit on cross-examination" category of cases,"'8
and for good reason. Stincer's claim possessed credibility under the
"limit on cross-examination" category of sixth amendment cases,
and therefore he could not logically argue that his case fit into neither
category. Justice Marshall asserted, in his dissenting opinion, that
even if the "limit on cross-examination" line of cases did not apply,
Stincer's exclusion from the in-chambers hearing still violated the
confrontation clause's "symbolic" goal of fairness.'82 However, prec-
edent fails to support Justice Marshall, because Delaware v. Fen-
sterer, which utilized neither the "out-of-court statement" nor the
176. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2660.
177. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). There, the court established
that a limitation imposed by either the law or the courts on a criminal defendant's
right to cross-examination could violate the confrontation clause.
178. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 1004.
180. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
181. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2664. For an example of a case in neither category,
see Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 S. Ct. 292 (1985) (per curiam).
182. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2670.
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"limit on cross-examination" categories, concluded that no sixth
amendment violation occurred.'83
Based upon the review of prior case law, Stincer possessed a
reasonable claim under the "limit on cross-examination" line of
confrontation clause cases. Therefore, the Supreme Court was re-
quired by precedent to address the second issue of whether a sixth
amendment violation actually resulted when Stincer was excluded
from the in-chambers competency hearing. Justice Blackmun's anal-
ysis took a general approach to the "limit on cross-examination"
category of cases before concluding that Stincer suffered no denial
of his rights under the confrontation clause. 84 However, Justice
Blackmun would have presented a richer discussion of a criminal
defendant's sixth amendment rights if he would have applied his own
concurring opinion from Ritchie to the Stincer case.'85
In Ritchie, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion expressed con-
cern that when a criminal defendant was denied access to information
before trial, his cross-examination of an adverse witness at trial might
be ineffective.' 8 6 Therefore, Justice Blackmun divided the "limit on
cross-examination" line of cases into two sub-categories. 18 7 Under his
second sub-group, simple questioning at trial not only failed to satisfy
a criminal defendant's right to challenge the credibility and bias of
adverse witnesses, but also created an impression, in the eyes of the
jury, that defense counsel was unnecessarily badgering an apparently
innocent witness. 88
In the case at bar, Stincer was refused access to the comments
made by the minor witnesses at the in-chambers competency hear-
ing. 189 If Stincer had participated in the session, he could have not
only presented his own questions, but also observed the minor
witnesses' responses to the questions challenging their competency.
This additional information may have then benefitted Stincer's cross-
examination of the witnesses at trial. Also, if Stincer did obtain
added information from personally attending the in-chambers hear-
ing, his defense counsel, in the eyes of the jury, might have appeared
183. Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 S. Ct. at 296 (per curiam).
184. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2666.
185. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004-06 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
186. In Ritchie, a criminal defendant was denied discovery access to a state
agency file that may have assisted the defendant in undermining the testimony of
the prosecution's key witness. Id. at 994.
187. Id. at 1004-05.
188. See supra note 147.
189. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2660.
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more justified in challenging the minor witnesses credibility and bias
at trial.
An application of the facts in Stincer to Justice Blackmun's con-
curring opinion in Ritchie, appears to lead to the conclusion that
Stincer's rights under the confrontation clause were compromised by
his exclusion from the competency hearing. However, if Stincer
suffered a restriction on his right to cross-examination, he would not
be entitled to an automatic reversal of his conviction.' 90 Instead, the
Supreme Court would remand the case to the Arkansas court for
application of the Chapman harmless-error analysis.' 9' In this man-
ner, Stincer's conviction would stand if the error was harmless, but
the Supreme Court's decision would deter any future temptation to
use in-chambers hearings to discuss substantive issues of the trial
outside the defendant's presence.
David T. Fisfis
190. See, e.g., Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1437.
191. See supra note 124. The Supreme Court had previously remanded to the
state court for a harmless error analysis in Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1438 and
Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002.
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